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Abstract 
[Excerpt] The American automobile industry has serious financial problems. Corporate executives from 
the Big Three (General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler) have testified before Congress about their need for 
federal credit (direct loans and guaranteed loans). This report examines the Chrysler loan guarantee 
program for possible insights that could assist Members of Congress in evaluating proposals to provide 
federal credit assistance. 
In 1979, Chrysler applied for federal loan guarantees. In 1979 and 1980, the economy was in recession 
and the price of oil had unexpectedly increased dramatically. However, at that time there was no financial 
liquidity crisis, as is the case today. Most of the arguments for and against the proposed Chrysler loan 
guarantee program are relevant to current proposals for credit assistance to the Big Three. For example, 
in the 1979 debate, proponents argued that the Chrysler loan guarantee would save many jobs. But 
opponents contended that the financial capital obtained for Chrysler by the proposed loan guarantee 
would have been used by other firms to expand their productive facilities, output, and employment. Thus, 
any Chrysler job losses could be offset by gains at other firms. 
Provisions in the Chrysler Loan Guarantee Act of 1979 included the establishment of a Chrysler Loan 
Guarantee Board, extensive federal oversight of Chrysler’s operations, detailed reporting requirements by 
Chrysler’s management, shared sacrifice of parties benefiting from the loan guarantee, and protection of 
the federal government’s interest. 
Chrysler used federal loan guarantees to borrow $1.2 billion of the $1.5 billion available and redeemed its 
guaranteed loans in 1982. Some critics argued that Chrysler was only able to return to profitability 
because of the imposition by the U.S. government of “voluntary” import quotas on Japanese vehicles. In 
1980, the Chrysler loan guarantee was treated as a contingent liability with no initial cost at the time the 
guarantee was provided. Because Chrysler repaid all of its guaranteed loans, the U.S. government 
incurred no budgetary cost. Furthermore, the U.S. government received warrants to buy Chrysler stock, 
which it subsequently sold at auction to Chrysler for $311 million. Thus, it can be argued that the U.S. 
government made a profit from the loan guarantee program. 
Currently, the Federal Credit Reform Act requires that the reported budgetary cost of a credit program 
equal the estimated subsidy costs to the taxpayer at the time the credit is provided. For proposed 
legislation establishing a new credit program, the Congressional Budget Office is responsible for making 
the initial estimate of the subsidy cost. Once legislation has been enacted, the Office of Management and 
Budget estimates the subsidy cost on the credit program. An appropriation for the annual subsidy cost of 
each credit program is made into a budget account called a “credit program” account. Thus, under today’s 
budgetary rule, legislation providing direct loans or loan guarantees to assist the automobile industry 
would require the inclusion of the estimated subsidy cost, which would require an appropriation of budget 
authority. 
This report will be updated as issues develop and/or in the event of new legislation. 
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The American automobile industry has serious financial problems. Corporate executives from the 
Big Three (General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler) have testified before Congress about their need 
for federal credit (direct loans and guaranteed loans). This report examines the Chrysler loan 
guarantee program for possible insights that could assist Members of Congress in evaluating 
proposals to provide federal credit assistance. 
In 1979, Chrysler applied for federal loan guarantees. In 1979 and 1980, the economy was in 
recession and the price of oil had unexpectedly increased dramatically. However, at that time 
there was no financial liquidity crisis, as is the case today. Most of the arguments for and against 
the proposed Chrysler loan guarantee program are relevant to current proposals for credit 
assistance to the Big Three. For example, in the 1979 debate, proponents argued that the Chrysler 
loan guarantee would save many jobs. But opponents contended that the financial capital obtained 
for Chrysler by the proposed loan guarantee would have been used by other firms to expand their 
productive facilities, output, and employment. Thus, any Chrysler job losses could be offset by 
gains at other firms.  
Provisions in the Chrysler Loan Guarantee Act of 1979 included the establishment of a Chrysler 
Loan Guarantee Board, extensive federal oversight of Chrysler’s operations, detailed reporting 
requirements by Chrysler’s management, shared sacrifice of parties benefiting from the loan 
guarantee, and protection of the federal government’s interest. 
Chrysler used federal loan guarantees to borrow $1.2 billion of the $1.5 billion available and 
redeemed its guaranteed loans in 1982. Some critics argued that Chrysler was only able to return 
to profitability because of the imposition by the U.S. government of “voluntary” import quotas on 
Japanese vehicles. In 1980, the Chrysler loan guarantee was treated as a contingent liability with 
no initial cost at the time the guarantee was provided. Because Chrysler repaid all of its 
guaranteed loans, the U.S. government incurred no budgetary cost. Furthermore, the U.S. 
government received warrants to buy Chrysler stock, which it subsequently sold at auction to 
Chrysler for $311 million. Thus, it can be argued that the U.S. government made a profit from the 
loan guarantee program. 
Currently, the Federal Credit Reform Act requires that the reported budgetary cost of a credit 
program equal the estimated subsidy costs to the taxpayer at the time the credit is provided. For 
proposed legislation establishing a new credit program, the Congressional Budget Office is 
responsible for making the initial estimate of the subsidy cost. Once legislation has been enacted, 
the Office of Management and Budget estimates the subsidy cost on the credit program. An 
appropriation for the annual subsidy cost of each credit program is made into a budget account 
called a “credit program” account. Thus, under today’s budgetary rule, legislation providing 
direct loans or loan guarantees to assist the automobile industry would require the inclusion of the 
estimated subsidy cost, which would require an appropriation of budget authority. 
This report will be updated as issues develop and/or in the event of new legislation.  
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he American automobile industry has serious financial problems. Corporate executives 
from the Big Three (General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler) have testified before Congress 
about their need for federal credit (direct loans and guaranteed loans). This report 
examines the Chrysler Corporation Loan Guarantee Act of 1979 for possible insights that 
could assist Congress in evaluating proposals to provide federal credit assistance. 


In the 1960s and 1970s, the Chrysler Corporation had a history of financial instability. During 
recessionary periods it had incurred large losses, but during periods of prosperity the corporation 
had usually earned high profits. Yet between 1967 and 1980, the company’s domestic market 
share had declined from 16% to 8.6%, arguably due to managerial errors, foreign competition, 
regulatory controls, and the energy shortage at that time. 
Chrysler failed to introduce a small car in the late 1960s, even though Ford produced the Pinto 
and General Motors began manufacturing its Vega. Chrysler refused to manufacture a new small 
automobile until it introduced its Plymouth Horizon and Dodge Omni models in 1977. The rising 
cost of gasoline, changing consumer tastes, and Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) fuel-
efficiency standards contributed to Chrysler’s troubles, because it had not shifted its production to 
smaller vehicles. Some corporate financial experts assert that Chrysler should have reduced its 
dividends in the early 1970s and used the funds to modernize its plant and equipment. Also, 
Chrysler made a belated attempt to compete overseas with Ford and General Motors, which was 
unsuccessful. 
In 1979, huge losses compelled Chrysler to sell off some of its subsidiaries, close plants, and 
reduce its employment. In July 1979, Chrysler requested and subsequently received federal loan 
guarantees to avoid bankruptcy. Losses continued throughout 1979, and Chrysler’s total loss for 
the year was $1.126 billion.1 
Ford and General Motors were in better financial condition than Chrysler, but also experienced 
large losses in 1979 and 1980 because of the sharp rise in the price of gasoline and the worst 
economic downturn since the Great Depression. “In 1980, the Big Three [General Motors, Ford, 
and Chrysler] lost a record $4.2 billion as their sales in that year plummeted 30% below 1978 
sales, reaching their lowest level since 1961.”2 As will be discussed in a subsequent section of this 
report, in 1981, the Big Three advocated and received the imposition by the federal government 
of “voluntary” import quotas on Japanese vehicles. These “voluntary” import quotas contributed 
to the return to profitability of General Motors and Ford, as well as Chrysler.  
                                                 
1
  U.S. General Accounting Office, Guidelines for Rescuing Large Failing Firms and Municipalities, GAO Report 
GGD-84-34, March 29, 1984, p. 15. 
2
  Stephen D. Cohen, The Route to Japan’s Voluntary Export Restraints on Automobiles, Working Paper No. 20, 
School of International Service, American University, p. 2. Available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/japan/
scohenwp.htm, visited Dec. 1, 2008. 
T 
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Advocates of the loan guarantees advanced four primary arguments. First, if Chrysler defaulted 
there would be an enormous loss in employment. Many of these job losses would occur in firms 
supplying parts and materials to Chrysler. Data Resources Inc. conducted a simulation of the 
Chrysler collapse and concluded that there would be a 500,000 near-term loss in employment and 
a longer-term additional employment loss of between 200,000 and 300,000. Second, some of 
Chrysler’s difficulties were beyond its control, particularly large price increases in oil obtained by 
the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. Third, federal safety, environmental, and fuel 
efficiency standards had been disproportionately costly for Chrysler compared to General Motors 
and Ford, because the larger corporations had longer production runs and thus could spread out 
their regulatory costs over more units. Consequently, Chrysler “deserved” federal compensation 
for its costs incurred in meeting federal regulations. Fourth, Chrysler manufactured the main 
battle tank for the U.S. Army; hence, if Chrysler went bankrupt national defense would be 
weakened. 
Opponents of the loan guarantee to Chrysler buttressed their case with five basic arguments. First, 
they contended that the analysis made by Data Resources Inc. was misleading. The financial 
capital which Chrysler would obtain with the loan guarantee could be used instead by other firms 
to expand their productive facilities, output, and employment. In addition, part of Chrysler’s lost 
sales would be picked up by General Motors and Ford. Second, the entire economy was 
experiencing high energy costs; thus a single firm such as Chrysler did not warrant preferential 
treatment due to the energy problem. Third, most of the regulatory costs incurred by Chrysler 
were due to fuel-efficiency standards. Yet Chrysler would have been compelled to improve the 
average mileage of its automobiles anyway, because of the rising cost of energy. Fourth, if 
Chrysler went bankrupt it would go into receivership under existing bankruptcy legislation. 
Profitable operations, such as its tank production division, would continue as a subsidiary of 
another corporation or as a new corporation. Fifth, the Chrysler loan guarantee might encourage 
other large corporations to obtain federal financial assistance. This would lead to a greater federal 
role in the economy and a reduction in the efficiency of private capital markets in allocating 
credit. 

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In January 1980, Chrysler Corporation Loan Guarantee Act of 1979 (the Act) was signed into law 
as P.L. 96-185. The Act included numerous provisions, which are summarized as follows:3 
• The Act established the Chrysler Corporation Loan Guarantee Board (the Board), 
which was composed of the Secretary of the Treasury (chairperson of the Board), 
the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the 
Comptroller General of the United States. The Secretary of Labor and the 
Secretary of Transportation served as ex officio nonvoting members of the Board. 
                                                 
3
  The provisions described in this section of this report are from the following source: U.S. Congress, House, Chrysler 
Corporation Loan Guarantee Act of 1979, Conference report no. 96-730 (to accompany H.R. 5860), Washington, Dec. 
20, 1979, 19 p. 
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• The Board was responsible for determining the terms and conditions under which 
it would make commitments to guarantee the payment of principal and interest 
on loans to Chrysler if the Board determined that (1) Chrysler had an energy-
saving plan satisfactory to the Board, (2) the loan guarantee was necessary to 
prevent serious negative effects of the economy, (3) Chrysler had submitted a 
satisfactory operating plan, and (4) Chrysler had submitted to the Board a 
satisfactory financing plan to meet the financing needs of the operating plan and 
which included an aggregate amount of nonfederally guaranteed assistance of at 
least $1.43 billion from Chrysler, banks, financial institutions, other creditors, 
suppliers, dealers, stockholders, labor unions, employees, management, state and 
local and governments, and others directly deriving benefit from the production, 
distribution, or sale of the products of Chrysler. 
• A loan guarantee could be issued only if the Board determined that (1) credit was 
not otherwise available to Chrysler under reasonable terms or conditions, (2) 
Chrysler’s prospective earning power and the value of the security pledged had to 
furnish reasonable assurance of the repayment of the guaranteed loan, (3) the 
loan to be guaranteed had an interest rate determined by the Board to be 
reasonable, (4) Chrysler’s operating and financing plans continued to meet Board 
requirements, (5) Chrysler was in compliance with its operating and financing 
plans, (6) the Board had received assurances that Chrysler’s operating and 
financing plans are realistic and feasible, (7) Chrysler agreed to reporting 
requirements of a revised operating and financial plan covering the period of the 
loan guarantee; and within 120 days following the close of each fiscal year, an 
analysis reconciling the corporation’s actual performance with the operating and 
financial plan was submitted, (8) there was no substantial likelihood that Chrysler 
would be absorbed by or merged with any foreign entity, and (9) Chrysler was in 
compliance with the terms and conditions of the commitment to issue the 
guarantees required by the Board. Any determination by the Board that the 
conditions established by the Act had been met would be conclusive. The Board 
would prescribe and collect a guarantee fee sufficient to compensate the federal 
government for all administrative expenses related to the guarantee but in no case 
could such fee be less than one-half of 1% per annum of the outstanding principal 
amount of loans guaranteed. The Board was to ensure that the federal 
government is compensated for the risk assumed in making guarantees. Thus, the 
Board was authorized to collect an additional fee above the fee to cover 
administrative costs, to enter into contracts allowing the federal government to 
participate in gains from the financial success of Chrysler, or use instruments 
deeded appropriate by the Board. All amounts collected by the Board would be 
deposited in the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts. 
• The Act described the proportionate share to be contributed by employees in 
order for Chrysler to receive the loan guarantees. 
• The Act required Chrysler to establish an employee stock ownership plan 
(ESOP). 
• The amount of loan guarantees could not at any time exceed $1.5 billion in 
aggregate principal amount outstanding. 
• Loans guaranteed under the Act would be payable in full not later than December 
31, 1990. 
  	
							 	

 		 ! #
• The Board was authorized to inspect and copy all accounts, books, records, 
memoranda, correspondence, and other documents and transactions of Chrysler. 
• In order to protect the federal government’s interest, the Board was granted 
extensive oversight authority including approval of the sale of any asset with a 
value in excess of $5 million and a labor contract having an aggregate value of 
future wages and benefits of $10 million or more. Debts owed the federal 
government would have priority, but the Board could wave such priority. 
• The Secretary of Transportation would submit to the Board and to Congress a 
planning study providing an assessment of the long-term viability of Chrysler’s 
involvement in the automobile industry. 
• The Board would submit reports to Congress semiannually for 1980 and 1981 
and annually for later years. 
• The authority of the Board to issue loan guarantees was to expire on December 
31, 1983. 
• The administrator of the Small Business Administration would investigate 
whether or not small-business automobile dealers should receive federal loans 
and loan guarantees. 
• The Act included amendments to the Electric and Hybrid Vehicle Research, 
Development, and Demonstration Act of 1976. 
 
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Chrysler used $1.2 billion of the $1.5 billion in loan guarantees. The corporation downsized its 
operations and returned to profitability. “The restructuring took place fairly quickly with less 
interruption of the firm’s operations than would have occurred in a bankruptcy.”4 In 1982, 
Chrysler was profitable and redeemed its government guaranteed notes in June and August of that 
year.5 

Some critics argue that Chrysler was able to return to profitability because of the imposition by 
the U.S. government of “voluntary” import quotas on Japanese automobiles, which were 
negotiated by the Reagan Administration and announced by the Japanese government on May 1, 
1981. The Big Three and the United Automobile Workers advocated for restrictions on Japanese 
automobile imports. Supporters of quotas in the Reagan Administration argued that the American 
automobile industry needed temporary restraints on imports in order to permit “breathing room” 
for the Big Three to retool their factories for the production of more fuel efficient vehicles.6 The 
“voluntary” import quotas provided financial benefits to the Big Three and American workers in 
                                                 
4
  U.S. General Accounting Office, Guidelines for Rescuing Large Failing Firms and Municipalities, p. 18. 
5
  Ibid., p. 17. 
6
  Stephen D. Cohen, p. 6. 
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the automobile industry. But, major Japanese manufacturers realized “windfall” profits and 
American consumers paid higher prices for vehicles.7 


Before FY1992, federal loan guarantees were treated as a contingent liability of the U.S. 
government. Thus, at the time a loan guarantee was granted, there was no budgetary cost. 
Because Chrysler repaid all of its guaranteed loans, no budgetary cost was incurred by the U.S. 
government. In addition, in return for the loan guarantee, the U.S. government had received from 
Chrysler 14.4 million warrants to purchase Chrysler stock at $13 per share until 1990. On 
September 12, 1983, the U.S. government auctioned these warrants, and Chrysler purchased them 
for $311 million.8 Thus, it can be argued that, from a budgetary standpoint, the Chrysler loan 
guarantee program made money for the U.S. government. 
		

 	
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-508) added Title V to the 
Congressional Budget Act.9 Title V, also called the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 (FCRA), 
changed how the unified budget reports the cost of federal credit activities (i.e., federal direct 
loans and loan guarantees).10 Before FY1992, for a given fiscal year, the budgetary cost of a new 
direct loan or loan guarantee was the net cash flow for that fiscal year. This cash flow measure 
did not accurately reflect the true cost of a loan or loan guarantee, which is its subsidy cost over 
the entire life of the loan or loan guarantee. 
Beginning with FY1992, federal credit reform legislation required that the reported budgetary 
cost of a credit program equal the estimated subsidy costs at the time the credit is provided. The 
FCRA defines the subsidy cost as “the estimated long-term cost to the government of a direct loan 
or a loan guarantee, calculated on a net present value basis, excluding administrative costs.” This 
places the cost of federal credit programs on a budgetary basis equivalent to other federal outlays. 
This change means, because the subsidy costs of discretionary credit programs are now provided 
through appropriations acts, the discretionary credit programs must then compete with other 
discretionary programs on an equal basis. Funding for most mandatory credit programs (generally 
entitlement programs) is provided by permanent appropriations. For a proposed credit program, 
the Congressional Budget Office is required to estimate the subsidy cost. If legislation is passed 
that includes this credit program, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is 
responsible for coordinating the estimation of subsidy costs. 
                                                 
7
  Robert W. Crandall, “Import Quotas and the Automobile Industry: The Costs of Protectionism,” The Brookings 
Review, vol. 2, no. 4, summer 1984, pp. 8-16. 
8
  Gary Putka, Chrysler to Pay U.S. $311 Million for Its Warrants, Wall Street Journal, Sept. 13, 1983, p. 3. 
9
  For a comprehensive analysis of the current budgetary treatment of federal credit, see CRS Report RL30346, Federal 
Credit Reform: Implementation of the Changed Budgetary Treatment of Direct Loans and Loan Guarantees, by James 
M. Bickley. 
10
 Currently, the budgetary cost of federal credit does not include market risk. A Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 
report examined two ways of including the market price for risk: risk-adjusted discount rates and option-pricing 
methods. CBO made estimates for the cost of the Chrysler loan guarantee using these two methods, which are available 
in the following report: Congressional Budget Office, Estimation the Value of Subsidies for Federal Loans and Loan 
Guarantees, Aug. 2004, 27 p. 
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An appropriation for the annual subsidy cost of each credit program is made into a budget 
account called a credit program account. Funding for the subsidy costs of discretionary credit 
programs is provided in appropriation acts and must compete with other discretionary programs 
for funding available under the constraints of the budget resolution. Most mandatory credit 
programs receive automatic funding for the amount of credit needed to meet the estimated 
demand by beneficiaries. Mandatory programs are generally entitlement programs for which the 
amount of funding depends on eligibility and benefits rules contained in substantive law. The 
subsidy cost of federal credit is scored as an outlay in the fiscal year in which the credit is 
disbursed by either the federal government or a private lender [Section 504d]. For mandatory 
credit programs, any additional cost from reestimates of subsidies for a credit program is covered 
by permanent indefinite budget authority. This additional cost is displayed in a subaccount in the 
credit program account. 
Also, beginning with FY1992, each credit program has a nonbudget financing account. Each of 
these nonbudget financing accounts receives payments from its associated credit program account 
equal to the subsidy cost at the time a new loan or loan guarantee is provided. They also acquire 
the value of the unsubsidized portion of the loans (actual disbursements by the government minus 
the subsidy cost). These amounts are borrowed from the Treasury through the loan program.11 
Furthermore, the financing accounts contain all other cash flows between the public and the 
government associated with each credit program [Section 502(5E6-7)]. These flows include “the 
disbursement and repayment of loans, the payment of default losses on guarantees, and the 
collection of interest and fees.”12 Because they are nonbudget, the cash flows into and out of these 
accounts are not reflected in total outlays, receipts, or surplus/deficit. The budget authority of a 
credit program provides the means for the credit program account to pay to the financing account 
an amount equal to that program’s estimated subsidy costs. The off budget borrowing from the 
Treasury for the unsubsidized portion of a credit program is included in the national debt. 
	
 
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This report examined the Chrysler Corporation Loan Guarantee Act of 1979 for possible insights 
that would assist Congress in evaluating proposals to provide federal credit assistance to the Big 
Three. In 1979-80, the economy was in recession and the price of oil had unexpectedly increased 
dramatically. However, there was no financial liquidity crisis, which currently exists. Most of the 
arguments for and against the proposed Chrysler loan guarantee program are relevant to current 
proposals for credit assistance. Provisions in the Chrysler Loan Guarantee Act of 1979 included 
the establishment of a Chrysler Loan Guarantee Board, extensive oversight of Chrysler’s 
operations, detailed reporting requirements by Chrysler’s management, shared sacrifice of parties 
benefiting from the guarantee, and protection of the government’s interest. Chrysler borrowed 
$1.2 billion of $1.5 billion available and redeemed its guaranteed loans in 1982. Some critics 
argued that Chrysler was only able to return to profitability because of the imposition by the U.S. 
government of “voluntary” import quotas on Japanese vehicles. In 1980, the Chrysler loan 
guarantee was treated as a contingent liability with no initial cost at the time the guarantee was 
provided. Currently, the FCRA requires that the reported budgetary cost of a credit program equal 
                                                 
11
  These transfers within the government represent transfers of budgetary resources rather than actual financial 
resources. 
12
  U.S. Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, Analytical Perspectives, Budget of the 
United States Government, Fiscal Year 2009, p. 359.  
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the estimated subsidy costs at the time the credit is provided. For proposed legislation 
establishing a new credit program, CBO is responsible for making the initial estimate of the 
subsidy cost. For example, 
The Advance Technology Vehicles Manufacturing Loan Program (ATVMLP) was 
authorized under Section 136 of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (P.L. 
110-140). Congress provided the necessary funding for the loans in a continuing resolution 
for federal appropriations (P.L. 110-329), approved Sept. 30. The continuing resolution 
contained provisions to enable automakers to access $25 billion in government loans to 
retool assembly lines to make more fuel-efficient vehicles. The resolution, enacted to fund 
the federal government through March 2009, included $7.5 billion to cover the cost of the 
loan program as estimated by the Congressional Budget Office.13 
Once legislation has been enacted, OMB estimates the subsidy cost on the credit program. 
This report’s examination of the Chrysler loan guarantee program raises some concerns relevant 
to today’s debate about credit assistance to the Big Three. First, current economic conditions 
differ for the automobile industry. In 1979, the downturn in automobile sales for the Big Three 
appeared temporary. Today, the downturn in automobile sales for the Big Three may be protracted 
and sales may not recover if brands are eliminated and plants permanently closed. Second, in 
1979, the budgetary treatment of loan guarantees and direct loans was on a cash flow basis. A 
loan guarantee was initially treated as cost free because it was a contingent liability of the U.S. 
government. Thus, possible future costs of a default were not considered. A direct loan was 
treated as a direct outlay, which did not consider the repayment of principal and interest. Today 
the cost of a credit program is the estimated subsidy cost to the taxpayer at the time the credit is 
provided. Third, in 1979 and 1980, if Chrysler ended automobile manufacturing, part of this 
decline in employment would have been offset by increased employment by General Motors and 
Ford. But, today this would not occur because all of the Big Three are in financial trouble and are 
requesting federal credit assistance. 
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